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Abstract
This article applies classical phenomenological notions for new modes 
of communication, namely, online learning. It is stated that empirical 
communication of online learning presupposes a multilayered transcendental 
intersubjective structure which might be fruitfully approached via 
phenomenological projects of affection by the Other’s look and perceptual 
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imagination. While a number of phenomenologists have contributed to the 
thesis of the article, Husserl and Sartre are of special importance for the author. 
Hence, part of this article focuses on theoretical analysis of some more (the 
Other’s look in Being and Nothingness) and less (intersubjective perceptual 
phantasy in Husserliana XXIII) known phenomenological concepts, while the 
other presents an attempt of actual phenomenology of online education and 
the unpredictable nature of the internet.
Keywords: phenomenology, online education, the Other, imagination, 
intersubjectivity.
Fenomenologija spletnega izobraževanja. Pogled Drugega (J.-P. Sartre) in 
intersubjektivna perceptivna domišljija (E. Husserl)
Povzetek
Članek klasične fenomenološke ideje aplicira na nove načine 
komuniciranja, in sicer na spletno izobraževanje. Zagovarja mnenje, da 
empirično komuniciranje znotraj spletnega učenja predpostavlja večplastno 
transcendentalno intersubjektivno strukturo, ki se ji plodno lahko približamo 
s pomočjo fenomenoloških razmišljanj glede afekcije s pogledom Drugega in 
perceptivne imaginacije. Medtem ko so k tezi, ki jo zastopa članek, prispevali 
številni fenomenologi, sta za avtorja posebnega pomena zlasti Husserl in Sartre. 
Zato se prispevek, na eni strani, deloma posveča teoretski analizi nekaterih 
bolj (pogled Drugega v knjigi Bit in nič) ali manj (intersubjektivna perceptivna 
domišljija v zvezku Husserliana XXIII) znanih fenomenoloških konceptov, 
medtem ko, na drugi strani, predstavlja poskus dejanske fenomenologije 
spletnega izobraževanja in nepredvidljive narave svetovnega spleta. 
Ključne besede: fenomenologija, spletno izobraževanje, Drugi, imaginacija, 
intersubjektivnost.
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“Every look directed toward me is manifested in connection with the 
appearance of a sensible form in our perceptive field, but contrary to 
what might be expected, it is not connected with any determinate form.” 
Jean-Paul Sartre: Being and Nothingness
Introduction
It is well known that during the 20th century phenomenology established 
itself as one of the most wide-spread and adaptive methodologies, thus fulfilling 
the academic dream of its founder Edmund Husserl. On the other hand, the last 
decades saw a massive sprawl of technological innovations, which eventually 
transformed virtually every aspect of civilized human existence. Hence, it is 
not only theoretically tempting but also socially vital to rethink several more 
or less prominent phenomenological projects in the face of these new horizons 
of human praxis and interactions.
In the time just after the “existential turn” of phenomenology, the exploration 
of the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) really began to take over almost entire continental 
philosophy. Initiated by such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and others, it broke with the solipsistic tone of early 
phenomenology and began to denote the primordial experience in terms 
of paraphernalia and engagement with tools and purposes (Heidegger) or 
finding oneself in the instrument-world shaped by the Other’s look (Sartre). 
Despite this shift of paradigm, Husserl’s legacy and the initial project of the 
phenomenological investigation of consciousness as Wissenschaft must not 
be underestimated. On the contrary, today scholars from various disciplines 
are urging to review and extrapolate some of the most important of Husserl’s 
phenomenological projects such as the constitution of the Other, bodility, 
memory, imagination, categorial intuition, etc.1 Hence, these projects gain a 
new meaning in the light of latest social and technological phainomena. On 
the other hand, technologically conditioned specific givenness of the Other, 
1  The significance of the finishing volumes of Husserl’s writings (Husserliana) is also 
worth noticing in this regard.
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fundamental role of images, new forms of coping with paraphernalia, existential 
spatiality and temporality shaped a wholly new way of communicative being 
online. Thus, the question is how we are to understand these transformations 
and what phenomenology has to do with them? In the search for an answer to 
this question we will analyze and conjoin several phenomenological projects 
initiated by Sartre and Husserl, which will also reveal the possibility of a fruitful 
correlation between egologic and existential phenomenology.
The Other’s look as basic affection: on the positive side
In his late text The Phenomenology of a Communicative Community (1932), 
Husserl encompasses a wide range of human activities (spoken language, 
writing, gesture) and states that such an activity founds community and serves 
as a basic condition for introducing changes and something new into world.2 
In short, without the communicative connection I could not identify the world 
of another human being, and hence her intentions which otherwise could 
become the ground for changes and/or learned experiences in my own world. 
Thus, besides turning to the living world as the ground for phenomenological 
research, Husserl’s late philosophy breaks with the idealist monadic worldview 
and stresses the positive constitutional role played by the Other.
Despite this widely accepted turn in phenomenology, later developments 
varied greatly from Husserl’s approach, in general, as well as concerning the 
positive outcomes of the encounter with the Other, in particular. For example, M. 
Heidegger’s existential hermeneutics always oscillated between rather cozy and 
unavoidable coexistence with others (Mitsein) and its threat to one’s authenticity 
(das Man); this is also the case with Sartre’s Being-for-others (l’être-pour-autrui). 
According to Edith Stein, we are able to reveal the universal properties of the 
objects given to us by empathy (Einfühlung).3 In this way, empathy appears as 
the necessary condition for experiencing the external (reality) and certain kinds 
of self-knowledge, including one’s bodily nature. Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Martin Buber, and others also stated that though being extremely 
2  See in this regard: Husserl 2008.
3  In this context, note that Stein observed that empathetic experiences are founded 
on direct perceptions of physical bodies or imagination. See in this regard: Stein 1989.
9challenging and affective, the Other serves as the necessary condition for the 
truth of the self. But no one dedicated more attention to the philosopheme 
“the Other” as Jean-Paul Sartre, French phenomenologist, novelist, and one of 
the founding fathers of existentialism, did. Needless to say, despite the certain 
academic and even cultural fame, his account remains somewhat ambivalent.
Though later thinkers, especially postmodern ones, often accused Sartre of 
creating just another self-centered idealistic philosophy of presence or even being 
a metaphysical humanist,4 he himself always believed in the constitutive power 
of that which we might (very carefully) call “the external reality,” manifesting 
itself in the conditioning by facticity, entanglement with affections, experience 
of scarcity, pressure of social circumstances, or … other fellow human beings. 
Actually, this kind of approach became the core of his late philosophy.5 However, 
already in his programmatic opus that introduced existential phenomenology, 
Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre presents the view on how we live our lives 
(which includes also how we change and/or learn in the broadest sense of the 
word), according to which it impossible to reflect upon my-self, the world, 
or the Other separately.6 Consequently, I argue that in Being and Nothingness 
Sartre presents the view that the Other’s look is one of the basic affections which 
empirically manifests itself as the experience of shame, and this kind of affectivity 
for Sartre has a fundamental phenomenological-constitutive meaning. On the 
other hand, this means that Sartre’s notion of the Other’s impact on one’s reality 
(and irreality in the Husserlian sense) was too seldom oversimplified as being 
negative and destructive (Zahavi 2010, 211). In the same way we might approach 
anxiety and accidental nature of being exposed to the Other in virtual reality 
from the psychological point of view, hence reducing it as an ontic-empirical 
mark of particular transcendental structures. Though it is true that Sartre 
(following Hegel) stresses the connotation of conflict or confrontation in the 
experience of the Other, there is more to that. Let’s take a closer look.
4  See, for instance: Derrida 1972, 137.
5  At the end, Sartre argues that philosophy must be practical and by this he means 
political. See in this regard: Anderson 1993.
6  See: Zahavi 2001.
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One way of presenting the Other’s gaze in Sartre’s philosophy is to view 
it as the limiting force of one’s transcendence, i.e. freedom. As for yourself, 
you can drift in the world almost as amorphous and de-substantial as heroes 
dwelling in the early Sartre’s literature, but in the eyes of others you always 
become solidified into one or another self, which is finalized by being 
forced into self-reflection. Others become vehicles of self-reflection, and 
this constitutive moment conflicts with the urge for individuality on both 
phenomenological and existential levels (a paradox already approached 
by Husserl in his celebrated fifth meditation). This conflict is accelerated 
by the empirical nature of the process—usually (empirically) the Other is 
giving-you-a-self basing her judgments only on a few unrelated cases of 
your factual behavior, which adds even more depth to the classic existential 
notion of the absurd. Though Husserl’s answer to the existential primacy of 
Sartre’s phenomenology is that “every indeterminacy in the factual domain 
is determinable before all determining experience, therefore determinable a 
priori. This implies that the cognizing subject can decide it only a posteriori, 
on the basis of actual experiences.” (Husserl 2005, 624)
The Other, for Sartre, is not just an empirically given other person or self. 
It is not an object, but a look, its being appears as “looking-at-me” (Sartre 
1992, 345). According to the phenomenological perspective, Sartre talks, not 
about inference, but about full-blown experience, hence all knowledge (of the 
self and/or the Other) comes as a whole (Gestalt). For example, the empirical 
situation of “being almost caught” phenomenologically reconstitutes the 
whole of your self-interpretation. This is a phenomenologically revealed 
structural part of existential experience called “being thrown” (Heidegger), 
which according to Sartre’s account presupposes the vital need to decide—
will I take the label presented by the Other’s look? That is how affection by 
the Other’s look followed by the ontic emotion (shame) provokes the choice 
which determines my existence. We cannot be alone; we need to compromise. 
Intersubjectively shared world (Husserl) here becomes the world taken from 
me and turned into some kind of object, which presupposes me as a part 
of it in the eyes of the other. What for me is just an occasion for the Other, 
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becomes my essence.7 Many thinkers of this kind (Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, 
and even the postmodernists in a way) thought that it’s just a matter of time 
when “I” will learn to catch myself, i.e. to participate in the objectification 
of myself according to vast paraphernalia of labels. Hence, “shame manifests 
our exposure, vulnerability, and visibility and is importantly linked to such 
issues as concealment and disclosure, sociality and alienation, separation 
and interdependence, difference and connectedness” (Zahavi 2010, 224). 
This quote captures well the whole constitutional complexity presupposed 
by the affection of the Other’s look and its empirical counterparts manifested 
in particular emotions.
In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1939), Sartre describes emotional 
experience as the manifestation of a “magical strategy,” whose aim is to 
transform a difficult situation. What Sartre is trying to show here is that that 
the maxim “no excuses” is relevant to the affective experience as to any other. 
It is true that shame experience brings up the ontological modification which 
affects the wholeness of my being—I am this kind of being and I am ashamed 
of it. But, according to Sartre, even in the face (and because) of this basic 
affection, we still can choose how to react. In this sense, emotions are series 
of decisions in correlation with affections. Contra psychic determinism 
emotion appears as a way of constructing the world.8 The great insight of 
Sartre is the emphasis on the Other as the trigger of the most fundamental 
constitutional points, which rather motivates than causes the world.9 
Because emotions are about the world they also express the existential 
modality “I can.” I choose emotion to achieve purpose or, as Sartre usually 
puts it, to escape (restructure the intentional flow).10 Sometimes emotional 
7  There is an interesting paradox here. It looks like that for Sartre the Other precedes 
me in giving me a self—a kind of an essence—, though his famous saying states that 
“existence precedes essence.”
8  The postulate that you can act freely even pre-reflectively is one way to see where 
Sartre opposes Freud.
9  Husserl understands “motivation” as a special structural relation between intentional 
acts called Fundierung avoiding connotations of psychological physical causality.
10 For Sartre, emotions have this “escape mode.” I choose joy or something else as a means 
to escape from unpleasant actuality. The degree of this affection may oscillate from slight 
changes in the mood up till the most brutal mental disorders (see Murakami 2013).
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transformation motivated by the Other substitutes action (excuse), but 
sometimes also initiates it (choice).11
Though under the Other’s look my original establishment of the relation 
between things is shattered and, as Sartre puts it, “the appearance of the other 
is disintegration as decentralization of the whole universe which undermines 
centralization which I am simultaneously effecting” (Sartre 1992, 343), this also 
means that seeing the Other amounts to being seen. “Being-seen-by the Other” 
is the truth of “seeing the other” (Sartre 1992, 257). In the look of the Other my 
freedom is being taken, but restored by the interpretation, one of which could 
be decision to agree upon some kind objectivation. Gradually, our expectations 
embrace the possibility of being-seen, and this possibility affects us in a peculiar 
way. Refusing to break through these “surveillance” situations, to affirm our 
ability to choose we transform ourselves from Being-for-itself (être-pour-soi) 
to Being-in-itself (être-en-soi; empirically manifested as pride, arrogance, etc.). 
This turning-of-your-self into a changeless object is the classic example of bad 
faith, but it is not only for reasons of self-deception, or we should rather say it 
also manifests itself in the face of the Other’s look. Objectivation often was seen 
as a threat to my personal freedom, but here self-objectivation, deconstruction 
of the difference between me and a thing, is a major self-defense step. Accepting 
other’s decision to freeze us into facticity as the ground for our choice to stay 
inert, we are trying to make use from the other perspective. Here again, the other 
appears as the perspective of self-understanding. In a sense, for itself it finds 
some comfort in being-taken to be in-itself. Besides being pushed into the in-
itself, I also choose to be taken like this; I become someone through those who 
are looking at me, but I still choose it. Put differently, the affective response to the 
Other’s objectifying gaze makes oneself learn what does it mean to be amongst 
humans, what kind of possible connections are there, and whether the Others’ 
look is really absolutely uncontrollable. Hence, the affection by the Other’s look 
might turn towards two directions—conformist self-objectivation or freedom of 
choice, introducing learning as openness to new experiences.
11  Even body is in the context of emotions/affections not about sensations—it is about 
getting ready for some action.
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Transcendental structure of online learning: intersubjective per-
ceptual phantasy
In the previous part we defined the Other’s look in Sartre’s existential 
phenomenology as the constitutive affection, which transcends relations given 
by direct perception thus making the notion relevant to the sphere of virtual 
relations. Now, it is time to explore how empiric online relations presuppose 
transcendental correlation between the affection by the Other’s look and the 
acts of intersubjective perceptual phantasy (Husserl 2005, 616).
It was Husserl’s understanding of empathy that was taken to be the classic 
account of the constitution of the Other (the 5th of Cartesian Meditations, 1931). 
Although Husserl battled the analogy argument by stating that precisely because 
the other I is given to me as person not as  merely a moving physical body, I don’t 
infer its subjective existence, but sort of have it in one blow or in propria persona, 
the problem with the notion is that it is still insufficient in those cases when the 
Other’s body as the condition for pairing (Paarung) is absent, which is precisely 
the case of virtual communication.12 In his study on the transcendental motivation 
and structural differences of various mental disorders, where the Other’s presence 
is crucial, Yasuhiko Murakami doesn’t mention Sartre, but comes close to our 
analysis when he states that “affection of contact is not limited to eye contact. 
It is an affection of dynamism that comes from another and aims at my body.” 
(Murakami 2013, 180) Apparently, we are not talking about the physical presence 
of some persons in online relations as well as physical bodies in phenomenological 
analysis. On the other hand, shame as the culmination of the affection by the Other’s 
look, strikes even when the affection-experiencing subject stands alone physically, 
i.e. is not in the direct presence of others, because the perspective presented by 
the Other is already internalized: Sartre talks a lot about the experiences of being 
“almost caught”—door creeping, etc.—, despite the physical absence of another 
human being: “a lot of things support the look” (Sartre 1992, 346). Hence, in order 
to understand the givenness of a directly absent Other in online learning process 
we must turn to the very peculiar and multilayered phenomenological project 
launched by Husserl, that is the consciousness of imagination.
12  See in this regard: Ricœur 2007.
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It is true that up to some point we need perceptual things or contents to constitute 
and share any possible experience including online learning environment, but 
the kind of perception involved here Husserl calls quasi-perception and is rather 
an instance of imagination.13 However, Husserl clearly distinguished between 
several structures which compose consciousness of imagination as an intentional 
act. On the one hand, we have phantasy or imagination proper, which differs 
from image-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) in that it is not rooted in any form of 
physical substrate, i.e. picture of any kind. Moreover, when we look at the picture, 
we are “using” image-consciousness to relate two levels of apprehension—image-
object (image which we perceive) and image-sujet (that which serves as the true 
referent of a picture). Now, it is clear that phantasy does not exhibit the structure 
of double apprehension (Husserl 2005, 25). It is not motivated by a particular 
image and is thus characterized as free play.14 
This is the more or less generally accepted typology of the consciousness 
of imagination as presented by Husserl, which was followed by Sartre, R. 
Ingarden, and many others. But if we take a closer look at some later published 
manuscripts, for example, from the Husserliana XXIII volume, we find that 
Husserl speaks about some rather intermediate acts of imagination which 
oscillate between those poles of pictorial and free imagination. Hence, we 
have the third element of the whole intentionality of imagination—the 
perceptual phantasy, which uses perceptual things to refer to the imaginative 
environment, but this imaginary environment is not rooted in the physical 
substratum of particular images. Eventually, we share not the referent of an 
image and not the image, but the same existential space or setting of a learning 
environment. Users can share a scene from a movie, a music piece, symbol, or 
even a sentence presented in some unusual circumstances to co-constitute the 
area for the game to happen.
13  In his writings on imagination, memory, and perception, Husserl uses the prefix quasi 
many times (quasi-actual, quasi-seeing, quasi-truths, quasi-facts, quasi-experience, 
etc.) mostly meaning the “as-if ” character that is posited by re-presentational positing 
of the phantasized Ego (Husserl 2005, 124).
14  Note that the ability to deny the object of perception and to posit in its place an 
irreality belongs to the essence of consciousness. This denial, for Sartre, is constitutive 
of our freedom (see in this regard: Sartre 2004).
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This “kind” of imagination takes perceptual things as vehicles to constitute 
the imagined space which in turn founds communication (usually, a playful 
one). It is important that objects of perception do not function as analogons15 
here (for example, like abstract chess figures), and images which are constituted 
by this imaginative consciousness don’t necessarily involve sameness for each 
imaginative ego (player). This means that there is some intersubjective ground 
for communication even before the empirical transmission of information. 
Online environment includes many objects for perceiving and/or handling 
which we “see” as something other, some plot or narrative which defines means 
and goals of this particular class, for example, tour dedicated to Sartre’s beloved 
places at the left bank of the river Seine. Hence, the multilayered structure of 
online communication-learning process might be presented as follows:
1) intersubjective perceptual phantasy—“transparent” perceptual objects 
(figments), shared meanings of common activity (game, seminar, quest, etc.) 
without fixed pictorial identity of the referent, which displace the self in such a 
manner that brings it into intersubjective imaginary environment;
2) image-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein)—images based upon a physical 
substratum (screen, interface, multimedia, etc.);
3) Phantasieleib participation—Leib here constitutes and sustains the 
role according to the particular learning task, hence presupposing certain 
integration of skills, goals, values, and affections;
4) concepts reflected and propositional knowledge defined.
According to Husserl, “art is the realm of phantasy that has been given form, 
of perceptual or reproductive phantasy presenting as depicting” (Husserl 2005, 
616), though it is very important to capture the difference between perceptual 
phantasy and pictorial consciousness: “In the case of a theatrical performance, 
we live in a world of perceptual phantasy; we have ‘images’ within the cohesive 
unity of one image, but we do not for that reason have depictions.” (ibid., 
616). The so-called “images” here are produced by the whole range of means 
(movements, expressions, reactions, etc.), and although Husserl could not apply 
it to online communication, it is tempting to connect it with the constitutive 
15  This is a real physiological or psychological element that is a constituent of the 
imaginative state.
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accomplishments of the affection by the Other’s look online. Hence, the first 
level of online communication does not involve image consciousness:
When a play is presented, no consciousness of depiction whatsoever 
needs to be excited, and what then appears is a pure perceptual figment. 
(Husserl 2005, 617)
The following is the difference between figment and image: the genuine 
figment (the wax figure) directly appears in the unity of reality, while the 
image does not genuinely “appear” in that unity but in its own space, 
which in itself has no direct relation to real space. The genuine figment, 
or let us rather say the genuine illusion, such as the wax figure in the wax 
museum or the panorama image that “disappoints” us, is the appearance 
of a thing; specifically, the appearance of reality. (Husserl 2005, 570)16
This analogy of ours might be validated only and only if interaction with 
computer related paraphernalia (“mouse,” screen, etc.) rests on the apprehension 
of a figment not an image in the proper sense, which in turn creates the space of a 
shared world or rather intersubjectively constituted quest for knowledge. As with 
the theatrical performance where “the real things called ‘scenes,’ actual curtains, 
etc., ‘present’; they serve to transplant us into the artistic illusion” (Husserl 2005, 
516), the real hardware, furniture, and any other coping is transformed into some 
scene by the virtual experience. This coping or, as Husserl states, capabilities 
is a unique feature of a physical thing in the realm of imaginations, because, 
differently as in the case of an image, a sound, or a written text, I instantly 
represent the horizon of possibilities according to these capabilities. Hence, my 
bodility becomes displaced into the imaginary coping. 
16  It looks like hardware as the vehicle of virtual reality perfectly fits the criteria for 
intersubjective perceptual phantasy, i.e. it “directly appears in the unity of reality,” has 
a “direct relation to real space,” and “is the appearance of a thing.” On the other hand, 
it perfectly unites signitive, pictorial, and perceptual ways of intending an object.
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Every technology, particularly those designed for communication, 
becomes an extension or our bodies (McLuhan). Even on the level of 
“motority” (Merleau-Ponty), every new technology demands a mastering of 
the appropriate system of reflexes, for example, mouse and screen conventions. 
On the other hand, not only the constitution of perceptual reality is dependent 
on the experience of bodily movements (kinesthetic experience), but also the 
unity between the acts which constitute perceptual phantasy are founded 
(Fundierung) in a specific “I can” (Fenige 1991, 78), i.e. on a non-thematic 
knowledge about the potentiality of bodily movement. Murakami, following 
M. Richir (who in turn followed Husserl’s notion of Phantasie-Ich; cf. 2000, 
137), suggests to call the body-awareness in the context of imagination the 
Phantasieleib: “Phantasieleib constitutes the core or ‘center’ of the world of 
phantasy; it can be regarded as the living body in the world of consciousness 
which is nonfigurable and non-representable.” (Murakami 2013, 184)
In phantasying, I often project myself into the phantasy world in 
such a way that I phantasy myself as someone else. If I call to mind 
my childhood, I see myself as a child; some image of my corporeal 
existence as a child plays a part, thrusts itself forward, and becomes 
the bearer of my experiences. But along with this, of course, I also have 
a direct Ego-consciousness to which my corporeal existence belongs 
in direct and familiar form, in which I presently find myself in living 
reality as having a body. (Husserl 2005, 557)
This is an incarnation of some role or quest identity reviewed by the Other 
and adapted for coping with specific paraphernalia and space-time of online 
possibilities. It integrates heterogeneous elements of body postures, motority, 
interface requirements in order to move (play) in this intersubjectively 
constituted environment no matter what imaginary form (fantasy world, 
road story, mysterious palace, sacred book, existential quest, etc.) it follows. 
Phantasieleib presupposes the transcendental possibility of the affection 
by the Other’s look, which exceeds actuality (eye contact, body contact, or 
voice) and operates at the level of perceptual phantasy. This enables us to 
creatively conjoin phantasy and perception, otherwise “it remains only a pure 
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Imagination (Einbildungskraft) without social context” (Murakami 2013, 
193).
Finally, being-for-the-other has another aspect which is very relevant in 
online relations—one never knows if it is him or his role that is under the gaze 
of the Other. Only on the fourth level of our structural hierarchy it is possible 
to evaluate how do the user and his role work together. Hence, the first three 
levels also exhibit this structure of pure passivity of unity, identity towards 
me, and my online appearance, while the fourth enables to deconstruct and 
evaluate it. Finally, the fourth level presupposes higher doxic forms such as 
“explication, syntactical judgment and ideation” (Cairns 2013). In short, these 
forms single out relevant moments out of complex objective sense constituted 
in pure passivity, confer a formal logical structure upon an it, and grasp the 
essence on the basis of intending an individual object, “which thereby gains 
the sense of being an instance of the universal” (Cairns 2013, xv). Active 
syntactical judgment and ideation “follow” the passively pre-constituted 
structure of objectivity. Here, all the propositional judgments, mistakes, and 
eventual evaluations appear. This fourth level brings us back to the actuality 
as the background of any phantasy: “what we call judgment pure and simple 
is here a distinctive case; namely, the case in which the explication, relation, 
predication is directed toward what is characterized as ‘actual’” (Husserl 2005, 
537), moreover: “judgments concerning what is essential are not changed by 
fiction, as we have already said” (Husserl 2005, 624).
Intersubjective e-topia: interruption, annulation, and authority 
According to Gaston Bachelard, individual existence is always encountering 
what he called “matter,” meaning first of all the existentially lived space.17 
Our experience of that space rests on various systems of representation, for 
example, rows of specific furniture in the libraries, new traffic designs, Google 
maps, etc. This experience in turn affects our ways of communication, hence 
the designer or just the co-active user of (virtual) space could reveal to our 
imagination new experiences and reinterpret our relations with reality.
17  Bachelard’s materiality is very close to Merleau-Ponty’s corporeality or “the carnal.” 
See in this regard: Bachelard 1994.
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As we learned from the great works of literature, such as the Bible or Tolkien’s 
epic tales, in order to learn you must get the whole world to be prepared for 
you as the context of understanding, hence virtual space is so notorious for 
the attention to details, everything exists in the state of lovely enchantment, 
which affects physical surroundings and movements. Reading, browsing, 
watching, or listening merge with the shared play on the screen; symbols, 
signs, pathways, and fonts design a certain mood of academic beauty where 
mystery and challenge dwell, where redundancy is filled with the expectations 
about what lies behind those names, doors, or audio-visual riddles.18 It is 
also the question of comfort, because in virtual reality intimacy and hyper-
textual autonomy, speed and variety of informational channels level the static 
authorities represented by traditional institutions and/or media. Nevertheless, 
it is still basically the affection by the Other, her presence given by the “look” 
constitutes the breakthrough with my unreflective and repetitive coping with 
things (gadgets) towards the intersubjectively constituted quest for knowledge.
The above outlined structure of the online learning process shows that 
communication begins with the communion with the Other not from concepts 
that I or she are initiating. Good internalization of the affection of the Other’s 
look grants Phantasieleib well, hence the possibility of the new (pour-autrui or 
communion with others) rather than repetition (en-soi or communion with 
things). Now it is time to examine how the affection by the Other via perceptual 
imagery and distant gadgetry also rests on the transcendental moments of 
interruption, annulation, and authority.19
According to Aron Gurwitsch’s field theory,20 a lot of things, but first of 
all my lived body (Leib), have the character of balancing on the margin of 
consciousness which means that different modes of bodility, i.e. kinesthetic and 
kinetic experiences, can enter the thematic field (how the main preoccupation 
18  Concerning the relation between imagination, emotions, and new knowledge 
Husserl writes: “In my quasi-being-in-a-mood, I am conscious of the mood of the 
landscape (as of a quasi-mood); and my quasi-being-in-a-mood exhibits to me the 
mood of the landscape.” (Husserl 2005, 566)
19  Reading and writing today has lost its Aristotelian linear form, now it is rather 
interruptive and inter-textual.
20  If all components of the field of consciousness were experienced as equally salient, 
we would indeed not be able to think and behave appropriately.
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of a given moment is presented) and eventually influence or even supplement 
the apprehension of the initial theme. Being in the midst of one’s everyday 
activities at the same time engaging in online learning while coping with 
relative media exposes, in comparison with the liturgical order of a real 
classroom, the body to unorthodox postures (sitting, lying, walking, etc.), 
spilling coffee, adjusting chair in the park, or noticing the waiter. This could 
affect the appropriation of the material in many ways as well as totally shut the 
process down in order to get back to it at the right time. Here class content, 
such as learning material, units, deadlines, etc., are being affected by initially 
marginal environment—kinesthetic experiences as well as social and physical 
realities of the “external” world (flue, time of the day, shopping mall buzz, etc.). 
Hence, the entering of the body into the online experiential field encompasses 
wide range of modalities spreading from the innate internal model of the body 
as the horizon of motor skills (Merleau-Ponty) and the ground zero reference 
(Husserl), or the narration of the body as the representation of the body 
stored in long-term memory (Ricœur), to the actual body as visuo-spatial 
representation of the body, and the conceptual and linguistic representations 
of the body and its evaluation by a specific culture.
On the other hand, being online makes the subordination between theme, 
thematic field, and margin very mobile. Your attention (or rather turning toward, 
according to Husserlian terms) is provoked to attend to the theme via various 
kinds of ways—images, language, movies, sounds, and notifications from 
colleagues and/or teacher.21 At the same time, social media notifications can 
enter the thematic field arising from the margin and reshape the initially given 
material. The problem online is that the same media moderate the thematic field 
as well as big portion of the margin. All this suggests that online we gradually 
become aware of a rich “humane plane” of oneself as well as the Other.
The issue of being interrupted and re-focused by the multi-material 
authority of a screen22 presupposes another moment (and modification) in 
21 Husserl makes a distinction between attention and turning toward: “Although attention 
is interwoven with every turning toward, attention is simple grasping and turning toward 
is the more universal. For we are turned toward not only in objectivating but also in feeling 
and willing, in every sort of spontaneity (position taking).” (Husserl 2005, 552).
22  Investigations on the “authority” of images and possibilities to manipulate them 
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the life of consciousness by which some perceptual phainomena (for example, 
hardware as well as physical surroundings) are annulled. Husserl calls it the 
annulling of conflict between perceiving and phantasy when the perceptual 
world does not actually disappear, but I “live” in the phantasy world, not in 
the perceptual world (cf. Husserl 2005, 540). The resolution of such conflict is 
a transcendental condition for any phantastic experience. Perhaps this is the 
place to mention that virtual experiences often are taken to be illusory. But 
structural analysis shows that, in contrast to the form of illusory experience, 
in the case of the virtual presentation we do not begin with the thesis of the 
reality of what appears perceptually. On the other hand, conflict exists here, 
too; however, only the conflict that is there from the beginning and does not 
become constituted through new experiences later on.
According to one of the most beloved Husserl’s pupils, D. Cairns, “phantasy 
is positing as a fiction against a fictive world background, but with the real world 
still intended as a background of this fictive one. The full sense of an object is a 
function of its background (inactual, retained, protended)” (Cairns 2013, xiv). 
So, the teacher and classmates are given to me “as if ” they were real, although 
this constitutes togetherness of the classroom without the particular image and 
perception of the classroom. This, in turn, neutralizes (Neutralität Modifikation) 
the physical surroundings, social relations, spatiality, and temporality while 
coping with gadgets remains transparent.
These kind of phantasies are not freely produced by us, but, rather, have their 
objectivity, they are prescribed for us, forced upon us in a way analogous to that 
in which the things belonging to reality are forced upon us by the succession of 
perceptions emerging in continuous conflict with actual experience or by the 
succession of spoken or written words. For example, various computer fonts 
presuppose “experiential” apperception of words as material substrate, but at the 
same time this apperception is cancelled, for in the world of actual experience 
they are printed black figures (on paper or screen) denoting significations that 
naturally carry that cancellation of actual perceptual experience, hence resting in 
phantastic experiences; and even the “daily use of language generally presupposes 
communication in phantasia” (Murakami 2010, 183).
already have a long and rich tradition; see, for example, the Kuleshov effect.
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Thus, there are intersubjective quasi-actual experiences that each of the 
subjects involved produces in such a way that each experiences the others as 
co-authors or co-players within the frame of its own actual experience: “At 
the same time each subject then posits something else that is experienced 
as identical by the experienced other, but vice versa also posits the other as 
someone who can and perhaps must behave in the same way.” (Husserl 2005, 
686) This co-phantasied motivation does not point to an identical referent, 
but rather means that the sameness of the referent (at the first ground level) 
is very important and specific, because it is shared without specifying its 
identity. Hence, various paraphernalia of online learning software might create 
the conditions of participation in the common practice without one definite 
referent of those objects. If there is some “alfa reference” (expression is mine) 
made by the authority of a teacher, it occurs only later in the discussion and 
serves for the purposes of teaching and evaluating (fourth level).23 But at the 
start there is no such dominating reference, so the function of this layer is 
to “agree” or meet or co-constitute the learning environment, using pieces of 
online paraphernalia without any definite imagery (second level):
When subjects engage in phantasy but do not phantasy 
intersubjectively (establish “objective” phantasies in their freedom), 
their phantasy objects are then restricted to their isolated individual 
subjectivity. But surely it is agreed that positing a value means the same 
as simultaneously positing subjects who, in valuing, constitute the 
value—presupposing only that the value is not itself a subject: Otherwise 
we have posited a subject anyway. (Husserl 2005, 655) 
That being said, we must not forget that these processes are inseparable 
from the interruptions of identity by the power of the Other, later taking the 
form of online communities rather that institutionalized unities. Today, formal 
23  There is an interesting structural similarity between several types of otherness, that 
of the teacher online and the terrifying Other that psychotherapy speaks about. Both 
are beyond concreteness, although they are distinguished by the powers of surveillance 
and control. On the other hand, the affection by the Other’s look in virtual space may 
grow into an almost Kafkian anonymous and constant threat to your privacy, etc.
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learning is blended with activities, which traditionally were thought to be a 
part of leisure time, like listening to music, etc. Online technologies thus create 
a space where you can study the relation to yourself. The later shows contexts 
that you dwell in, the importance and the preferences that you make and how 
you express it. Of course, choices are hierarchical and our preferences in turn 
depend on external classifications. That is how the dialectics between the 
Other’s look and intersubjective perceptual phantasy from being an existential 
one turns into social dialectics.
Conclusions
Phenomenological analysis of online learning environment reveals that 
it is constituted by the affection of the Other’s look (Sartre), coping with 
paraphernalia (schematized perception), and two intentional structures of 
imagination—image-consciousness (physical imaging) and intersubjective 
perceptual phantasy (figment based shared free play of imagination). There is 
a dialectical relation between perceptual phantasy and the Other’s look—while 
the Other’s look constitutes the affection and initiates contact, perceptual 
phantasy online (contra face to face relations in a classroom) is necessary to 
create a bond, space, and quest as intersubjective experiences. This represents 
a transcendental structure behind empirical communication. While proper 
learning happens on the (fourth) level of reflection, those initial stages show that 
intersubjective imaginative communication is there even before its expression 
via propositional forms. The affection by the Other’s look constitutes the 
breakthrough with one’s unreflective and repetitive coping with things (être-en-
soi) towards the intersubjectively constituted quest for knowledge (l’être-pour-
autrui). On the other hand, intersubjective perceptual phantasy encompasses 
the infinite horizon of conflicting authorities, moments of interruption and 
annulation, mixes experience, and thus humanizes the learning material and 
presupposes an autonomous and responsible student.
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